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LEBANON: French Policy Concerns

(Information as of 0100 EDT, 25 October 1983)

President Mitterrand's trip to Beirut and statements by other French officials show resolve to keep French forces in Lebanon, but Paris will be reluctant to expand the scope or mission of its Multinational Force contingent. [redacted]

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French Prime Minister Mauroy and Defense Minister Hernu have echoed Mitterrand's support for President Gemayel and his assurances that France will keep its peacekeeping force in Beirut. Only Foreign Minister Cheysson, who is often given to hasty and ill-considered remarks, has hinted that Paris might reconsider its policy. The Communist Party, the junior partner in the ruling coalition, is the only political party calling for a pullout. [redacted]

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Both Italian Prime Minister Craxi and Defense Minister Spadolini have stated publicly that Rome will not withdraw its troops in the face of the terrorist attacks in Beirut. [redacted]

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Spadolini did, however, indicate that Rome will await the results of the Lebanese reconciliation talks scheduled to begin next Monday before making a final decision on its long-term presence in Lebanon. The decision would include the possibility of participation with Greece in the proposed observation force in the Shuf region. [redacted]

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Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti publicly cast doubt on Italian involvement in the truce observation force, saying that Italian troops should not be subjected to risks. According to press accounts, the Greek Government also indicated that it will reconsider its commitment to the observation force in light of the attacks Sunday. [redacted]

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The UK, in a statement to the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary Howe, pledged to persevere in Lebanon. It is sending land forces commander General Kitson to Beirut for a first-hand evaluation of the situation. The British have told the US Embassy in London that they want "urgent consultations" with the contributors to the Multinational Forces. [redacted]

Comment: The French have followed a policy in Lebanon of positioning their troops to avoid conflicts, in hopes of encouraging Syria, Israel, and the PLO to remove troops from the country. The French support Gemayel as a potential unifier of the country, and they are trying to avoid favoring any particular faction. [redacted]

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An expansion of the French force would undermine these goals, and increased French patrolling would not be likely to stop suicidal attacks. The French also are aware that the Syrians distrust them and would object to increased troop levels or operations outside the capital. For these reasons, the French would prefer to expand the role of the UN in the peacekeeping force rather than increase their own participation. [REDACTED]

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Paris may conclude that the attack on its troops Sunday was not strictly related to Lebanon. If Iranian involvement is proved, the French are likely to interpret the bombing as retaliation for their increasingly overt support for Iraq. Paris also will hesitate to send more troops to Lebanon when French interests elsewhere, such as Iraq, are threatened. [REDACTED]

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Italy and the UK are unlikely to withdraw their contingents in the immediate future, because both countries would be sensitive to charges they have backed away from their commitments. [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, the Italian, British, and French Governments had previously been giving serious joint consideration to a reduction of their presence in Lebanon. Once the current crisis ebbs, they may begin again to discuss possible means—such as the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force—to extricate themselves from what they view as a hopeless situation. [REDACTED]

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
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GRENADA: Tension Remains High

(Information as of 0100 EDT, 25 October 1983)

Military activity intensified over the weekend as a result of anxiety over the threat of an invasion by forces of the US and the Caribbean Community. [redacted]

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The headquarters of the Grenadian Army reportedly has moved from Fort Rupert to Fort Frederick, and Army leaders have been observed traveling to and from Fort Frederick. A Grenadian resident saw a convoy of trucks moving south on the road to Point Salines International Airport on Sunday. The same source reported a large truck convoy headed north on the road leading to the POL facility north of St. Georges on Friday. [redacted]

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The wife of the Cuban Ambassador to Grenada stated on Sunday that the callup of the militia has not been successful. She said that the citizens are not responding and that the people probably will not defend the actions of the Military Council. She noted yesterday that there was considerable tension and that many Grenadians believed that some sort of military intervention was imminent. [redacted]

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The Cuban Connection

A nonscheduled Cubana Airlines AN-26 aircraft flew from Cuba to Grenada yesterday. According to one of the US official visitors, eight passengers got off and were met by the Cuban Ambassador's car and two other vehicles. [redacted]

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Comment: The Cuban aircraft that arrived in Grenada yesterday may have carried a delegation to ascertain the new regime's intentions and perhaps make contingency plans for the possible evacuation of the approximately 400 Cubans from the island. [redacted]

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Prospects for Instability

[redacted] 25X1
 [redacted] Grenada faces additional instability. [redacted] 25X1
 [redacted] the island's economy will be devastated by the loss of tourism, 25X1
 the trade sanctions imposed by the Caribbean Community, and the
 denial of access to the facilities of the Eastern Caribbean Central
 Bank. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

almost all of the members of the 16-member military regime took
 leading parts in the military coup of 1979 that brought former Prime
 Minister Bishop to power. Following the coup, these individuals
 became the nucleus of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army. [redacted] 25X1
 [redacted] most of the leaders have reputations for violence, and 25X1
 three have been accused of torturing prisoners. [redacted] 25X1

The information indicates that President of the Military Council
 Austin may be only a figurehead chairman of the council. The other
 three principal leaders—James, Layne, and Cornwall—are described
 as intelligent, ambitious, and ruthless. [redacted] the three 25X1
 may well remove Austin when he has exhausted his usefulness. [redacted] 25X1

Jamaica's Manley Reacts

The former Prime Minister of Jamaica and the leader of the
 opposition party there, Michael Manley, issued a strongly worded
 statement last week condemning the Grenadian Military Council. On
 behalf of his Socialist International-affiliated party, Manley severed
 relations with the Grenadian leadership's party and recommended
 that the Socialist International organization do so also. [redacted] 25X1

The Jamaican leader urged the international isolation of
 Grenada's new ruling regime, but warned against foreign intervention.
 According to Havana Radio, Manley has congratulated the Cuban
 Government for its position of noninterference in the overthrow. [redacted] 25X1

Comment: Manley's tough stand against the Grenadian military
 regime reflects the personal revulsion of most regional leaders, but
 probably was designed also to increase his own image at home.
 Manley was closely aligned with Havana during his tenure as Prime
 Minister, and he is now attempting to play down his radical ties to
 improve his reelection prospects. [redacted] 25X1

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Manley's close ties with President Castro suggest he may have consulted with the Cubans prior to his condemnation of the new Grenadian rulers. Although Havana has refrained from taking a similar position so far, Manley's stand probably will influence Havana's policy and make it more difficult for Cuba to come to Grenada's assistance. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Statement

The USSR charged yesterday that the US is "organizing broad armed interference in Grenadian affairs." A TASS commentator observer called this "an extremely dangerous venture" that menaced Latin American peace and could further worsen the international situation. The commentary said recent developments in Grenada were "strictly internal affairs." Moscow so far has avoided characterizing the new regime. [REDACTED]

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USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Nuclear Missile Deployments

The Soviet Defense Ministry's announcement yesterday that preparations have begun for deploying "operational-tactical" missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia increases the probability that the Soviets plan to move SS-12/22 ballistic missiles, as well as SS-23s, into Eastern Europe as one response to the NATO INF deployments.

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The announcement, which was carried by TASS and Radio Moscow, said that an understanding had been reached with East Germany and Czechoslovakia and that work had started in those countries in preparation for the deployments. The East German National Defense Council and the Czechoslovak Government also made similar announcements. All of the announcements identified the measure as a response to the NATO preparations.

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Comment: Use of the term "operational-tactical" clearly indicates that the Soviets were referring to the SS-12/22 or the SS-23. The term would not apply to the SS-21—a "tactical" missile already fielded with more than half of the 19 Soviet divisions in East Germany.

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Deployment of the SS-23, which is designed to replace the Scud-Bs already in Eastern Europe, probably would not require the permission of the host country. Fielding the SS-12/22, however, might have required negotiation of a new agreement with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. This missile has an operational range of over 900 kilometers and has never been deployed outside the USSR.

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A recent claim by sources in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry that their government persuaded the Soviets not to deploy new missiles on Hungarian soil as part of the countermeasures to NATO deployment also would be consistent with sending SS-12/22s to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, but not Hungary. Budapest is not likely to have objected to Moscow's already planned replacement of the short-range missiles with SS-21s or SS-23s, but it is plausible that Hungary persuaded the USSR not to field a longer-range system.

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Deployment of SS-12/22s in Eastern Europe would give the Soviets a program they could cancel as part of a settlement with the US. They could do so without affecting their future replacement of the Scud with the SS-23.

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PAKISTAN: Zia's Tough Stand

President Zia reiterated on Saturday that he will not compromise with the opposition coalition, which continues to sustain agitation in Sind Province. [redacted]

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Zia, in a speech to the Federal Advisory Council, charged that the center-left Movement for the Restoration of Democracy is trying to seize the victory it cannot win at the polls and that the disturbances in Sind are the work of a small minority aided by foreign countries. Zia denied his talks with conservative and religious politicians are stalling tactics. [redacted]

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The President also said he has not decided when to hold national elections or whether to permit the parties to participate. He added, however, that the concept of a ruling party and an opposition is contrary to Islam. [redacted]

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Anti-Zia agitation remains centered in Sind, although no serious incidents have been reported since Wednesday. [redacted]

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Comment: Zia's hard line will be particularly disappointing to the Sindhis, and it almost certainly rules out an early end to the unrest. Although Zia has left open the possibility of compromise, his declaration that partisan politics is un-Islamic would appear to undercut negotiations. Even politicians on the right who seem more willing to compromise than those in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy are likely to find the President's stance unacceptable. [redacted]

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Zia's belief that India and the USSR are trying to exploit the unrest probably has increased his resolve not to give in to the opposition. Although educated Pakistanis will be skeptical of Zia's claim that outside forces are adding to the unrest, most Punjabis are likely to rally behind Zia in the face of Indian meddling. [redacted]

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NETHERLANDS: Controversy Over Nuclear Weapons

The Dutch cabinet continues to be split on how far to push NATO for a reduction in the Netherlands' nuclear roles, but Prime Minister Lubbers is trying to suppress dissent in the interest of Alliance unity.

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Defense Minister de Ruiter sought cabinet authority last week to make public his dissatisfaction with the report on nuclear reductions to be submitted to Alliance Defense Ministers tomorrow by the NATO High-Level Group, according to the US Embassy. Lubbers overruled de Ruiter and noted that the report is a substantial move in the right direction.

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The report recommends that NATO reduce or eliminate atomic demolition munitions and the Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile. In cabinet discussions earlier this year, Lubbers and Foreign Minister van den Broek had advocated the reduction of these two nuclear roles, and de Ruiter wanted these plus 8-inch nuclear artillery and nuclear depth charges to be eliminated for the Netherlands.

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Comment: Most Dutch politicians, including Lubbers, see reductions in nuclear tasks as a tradeoff for INF basing. De Ruiter has taken the strongest antinuclear stance within the cabinet, both on the reduction of Dutch nuclear roles and on INF. In public, however, he subordinates his views to the cabinet consensus.

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If de Ruiter comes to believe that the government is not seriously considering his opinions on what he sees as a "moral issue," however, he might resign and become an active opponent of INF deployment. This could invite other Christian Democrats from the antinuclear left wing to defect from the coalition and jeopardize the prospects for final approval of INF basing.

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CHINA: Strains Within the Leadership

Recent reports suggest strains are developing in the relationship between Deng Xiaoping and his political heir, Hu Yaobang. [redacted]

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[redacted] Deng is dissatisfied with Hu's conduct as party General Secretary. Hu is said to exceed frequently his authority in public statements, to have caused bureaucratic discord through disregard for established procedures, and to display lapses in judgment. [redacted] Deng may now be questioning his decision to back Hu as China's future leader. [redacted]

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Hu—like Deng—is abrasive, combative, and impulsive. He is not widely admired by the Chinese. [redacted]

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Comment: Reports of high-level friction are not unusual. Although Hu may be experiencing the roughest period in his long relationship with Deng, he also certainly is not in jeopardy of being replaced as party General Secretary. [redacted]

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During the past two years, Hu—with Deng's help—has made substantial progress toward establishing a firm base of political support by placing loyal followers in key positions. China in recent years has repeatedly boasted of its political stability, and Deng would want to avoid the political damage at home and abroad that would accompany a succession crisis. [redacted]

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Nevertheless, no modern Chinese leader has succeeded in creating durable succession arrangements. Once an heir is named, he becomes a political target for others in the leadership. Strains also may result from the heir's impatience to assume power or from the senior leader's unwillingness to yield authority. [redacted]

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EC: Disagreement Over Industrial Policy

West Germany's rejection of France's proposals for an EC-wide industrial policy that includes protectionist measures indicates that future EC debate over this issue will become increasingly contentious.

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The French want significant but temporary increases in EC external tariffs on finished products, accompanied by greater constraints on using imported components in products assembled in the EC. The proposal reflects the emphasis in French policy on substantial government involvement in the development and direction of industry and its acceptance of limited competition between firms.

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Chancellor Kohl expressed fears at the cabinet meeting that such attempts to close EC markets would aggravate current strains with the US over the Community's agricultural policy. Economics Minister Lambsdorff criticized the French plan as just another way for Paris to get more money out of EC coffers.

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Comment: The West German cabinet debate reflects the growing interest in developing an industrial policy for the EC. Although it is rejecting the French proposal, Bonn has reacted more favorably to a British paper advocating a free market approach to industrial policy and less reliance on EC funding.

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The French believe that emerging West European high-technology industries—particularly their own—can compete only within a protected and regulated EC market sheltered from US and Japanese competition. Paris continues to push its EC partners to work out a common industrial policy, and it probably will intensify its efforts upon assuming the EC presidency in January 1984.

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CENTRAL AMERICA: Peace Negotiations

Foreign Ministers of the Contadora nations—Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama—have approved three draft treaties for submission to the Central American countries. Panamanian Foreign Minister Ortega says the ministers, during their meeting in Panama over the weekend, prepared preliminary versions of a general Central American peace treaty and of bilateral agreements between Nicaragua and Honduras and between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The Contadora Vice Foreign Ministers are to meet in Panama next week to revise the drafts based on Central American reactions and to work on three additional treaties on reductions of arms, foreign military advisers, and military forces. The Contadora countries plan to call for a meeting with the Central Americans to take place next month during the OAS General Assembly session.

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Comment: Nicaragua probably will support the bilateral treaties, but it will insist that the additional agreements address the situation in El Salvador. The other Central American countries are likely to resist bilateral agreements unless they are assured of verifiable multilateral arrangements to limit Nicaragua's arms buildup and support for revolutionaries in the region.

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Special Analysis

EUROPE: Prospects for Disarmament Conference

Delegations from 35 European nations meet today in Helsinki to begin negotiations on procedure for the Conference on European Disarmament, which is scheduled to begin 17 January in Stockholm. As in the recently concluded CSCE meeting in Madrid, participants will negotiate as blocs—West, East, and neutral and nonaligned. None of the blocs evidently have coordinated positions on procedure. In addition, they have just begun to address seriously the confidence and security building measures, which are to be the basis of discussions in Stockholm. The Soviets and their allies almost certainly will exploit the Helsinki Conference to assail NATO's INF plans, and it may thus prove difficult to settle procedural matters within the three-week deadline.

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CSCE participants agreed to hold the first phase of a European Disarmament Conference to negotiate confidence and security building measures that are "militarily significant, politically binding, and verifiable." Under this mandate, these measures would be applicable to the "whole of Europe"—as the West sees it—including the portion of the USSR west of the Urals.

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No agreement was reached at the CSCE meeting on whether there would be a second stage that would address actual disarmament measures. The first phase presumably is to last until the next full CSCE review meeting in Vienna in November 1986.

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Each participant has general aims for the conference at Stockholm, but most have not yet developed specific objectives. According to the US Mission to NATO, the Allies have been meeting at all levels since late August. At the meeting last week of the North Atlantic Council, they again failed to agree on agenda, procedure, or public diplomacy strategy for Helsinki.

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NATO representatives met yesterday to try to resolve at least some outstanding differences. They just began to debate the US package of confidence and security building measures they will offer at Stockholm.

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Reports of neutral and nonaligned discussions show a similar lack of progress.

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The Allies

The Allies look to the US to take the lead in formulating the measures to serve as the basis of the West's position at Stockholm. At the same time, West Germany and particularly France do not want the US to dominate Allied coordination. [redacted]

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Most of the Allies oppose any direct reference at Helsinki to the measures the US recently presented for NATO discussion but would like the West to acknowledge that a second phase of the conference could lead to "disarmament negotiations." Moreover, the European Allies are working through the EC's framework for political cooperation to coordinate positions on the conference as they have coordinated policy on CSCE in the past. [redacted]

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The smaller Allies also could be troublesome. Norway is attracted to measures on naval maneuvers that could complicate NATO activities. [redacted]

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Greece is likely to voice its opposition to INF deployments. Turkey will demand that, if confidence and security building measures are extended to non-European territory of Turkey and the USSR, these measures also should cover sea and air areas. Both Athens and Ankara may use the conference to promote their positions on Cyprus. [redacted]

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USSR and the East

Given the imminence of NATO INF deployments, Moscow will try to exploit the nominally procedural Helsinki Conference to influence West European public opinion on security issues. [redacted]

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Soviet officials have told Western diplomats that Warsaw Pact initiatives contained in the Prague Communiqué of 5 January 1983—especially the proposal for a nonuse of force agreement with NATO—probably will be the basis of Eastern strategy in the European Disarmament Conference. The Prague initiatives included a proposal for the end of military alliances and a freeze on military budgets. In addition, Moscow might call for nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of nonnuclear states. [redacted]

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Swedish Embassy officials in Moscow report that the Soviets plan to send a 40-man delegation to Helsinki—an unusually large group for procedural talks. The chief negotiator will be Oleg Grinevskiy, an “ambassador-at-large” with experience in the SALT talks and other arms negotiations. [REDACTED]

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Grinevskiy's deputy will be Igor Andropov, the son of the Soviet leader. Other Soviet delegates have broad experience in SALT, MBFR, and other East-West arms talks. [REDACTED]

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Neutral and Nonaligned Nations

The conference offers the neutral and nonaligned nations their first opportunity to participate in a major arms control forum. Most want to foster detente and to serve as mediators between East and West. [REDACTED]

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Many of these countries see the wisdom of limiting the conference to development of confidence and security building measures, but they also are drawn to Eastern declaratory measures—particularly those that would limit nuclear weapons. Sweden, for example, probably will push the idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. [REDACTED]

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In addition, pro-Arab Yugoslavia may support measures to limit US use of European territory as a staging point for US troop movements toward the Middle East. Malta is likely to call for security measures covering the Mediterranean. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Virtually all the Allied and neutral and nonaligned nations want to keep the Helsinki meeting as short as possible and confine it to procedural issues. Nonetheless, given the contending views of the participants on procedures and on the agenda, the preparatory conference will not have an easy time finishing its business in three weeks. Moreover, the level of East-West polemics is likely to be high as INF deployments approach and the Soviets threaten countermeasures. [REDACTED]

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The size and composition of the Soviet delegation indicate that Moscow regards the Helsinki Conference as a valuable opportunity to appeal to West European public opinion on security issues. The Soviets and their allies probably will preview their substantive positions for Stockholm and will lobby neutral and nonaligned and other Western delegations to oppose US and NATO policies. [REDACTED]

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